The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program has produced rental homes for low--income residents for over two decades. Using the administrative data on LIHTC projects and elementary schools in the state of Texas, we find that the overall impact of LIHTC projects on nearby schools is essentially zero. That the perception of possible deterioration in school performance becomes the key reason for "nimbyism" against LIHTC, our study suggests these fears are unfounded. The study uses a panel of school--level performance data for the entire state of Texas. The school--level data is geographically associated with LIHTC projects, facilitating a panel--type estimation of the consequences of the LIHTC program on school--level academic ratings.
Introduction
The availability of affordable housing is a pressing issue in most metropolitan areas in the United States. Many communities struggle to provide housing options for low--and moderate--income residents. In high cost metropolitan areas, housing options for professionals such as teachers and police officers are often scarce in the communities where they work. Even more challenging is housing very low--income residents, such as families living off minimum wage salaries. In response to these shortages, several public policies and programs have been tried, including public housing, housing vouchers and certificates, inclusionary zoning, tax preferences for low--income housing, and local affordable housing mandates or offsets.
Finding a suitable location for low--income housing is a challenge for both developers and municipal officials. Local residents often exhibit a "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) attitude.
Community opposition may stem from building designs or quality, the potential impacts to historical neighborhood characters, the decline in open space, perceptions of decreases in public services, fear of enhanced criminal activity, and perceptions of negative effects on property values (Downs 1982; Finkel, Climaco et al. 1996; Pendall 1999; Turner, Popkin et al. 2000; Nguyen 2005 ). Moreover, parents in the potentially impacted neighborhoods may be concerned that their neighborhood public schools will become over crowed and that low--income kids from publicly--driven multi--family housing will exert negative peer influences. Such NIMBY sentiments may deter the construction of new low--income housing from certain neighborhoods or drive residents to "flee" the neighborhood (or local school) after the construction of the low--income units, causing a downward spiral in the local schools.
Several studies have used changes in property values to estimate the potential impacts of publicly--driven low--income housing on neighborhoods. Recent reviews can be found in Nguyen and in Ezzet--Lofstrom and Murdoch (Nguyen 2005; Ezzet--Lofstrom and Murdoch 2007) .
However, we are not aware of any studies that have looked at the direct relationship between the emergence of low--income housing and the academic performance of nearby schools. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether low--income housing, built through the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program, affects neighborhood public school performance. To carry out this purpose, we created a panel data set on approximately 4000 elementary schools in Texas by spatially merging data from the almost 2000 Low--Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program properties in Texas with Texas Education Agency accountability data on the elementary schools. The data set facilitates estimates of the relationship between changes in school academic rating and changes the number of nearby LIHTC units. Generally, we find little evidence to suggest negative effects from LOIHTC units. In fact, the contemporaneous impacts appear to be positive, significant and robust to alternative specifications. Of setting these, the one period lag effects are negative and have almost the same magnitiude.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of the LIHTC program with a focus on the state of Texas. Then, we discuss some of the ways that potential LIHTC units could impact local schools. In the fourth section, we describe the data and main variables. The fifth section contains the empirical anlysis followed by some discussion about the results.
Overview of Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program
The LIHTC program is part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. It is the largest program for producing affordable rental housing. Primarily serving residents making 60 percent of area median income or less, the LIHTC program gives a dollar--for--dollar federal tax credit to private investors in return for project equity, reducing the amount of required finance and thereby making rents more affordable. The typical amount of tax--credit equity raised in a 9 percent tax--credit transaction is between 45 percent and 75 percent of the development costs.
Investors such as financial institutions and corporations purchase the tax credits to lower their federal tax liability over a 10--year period. Financial institutions that purchase credits for developments within their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) assessment areas get CRA credit and all investors earn attractive rates of return. The yields on tax credit investments in recent years have averaged between 5 and 7 percent. Federal law requires that the rents and incomes remain restricted for 15 years, but Texas employs an extended land--use agreement that retains the units in the affordable housing stock for at least 30 years. middle--and upper--income areas. These findings suggest that the Texas LIHTC program may have contributed to de--concentrating poverty and integrating low--income households into higher--income neighborhoods.
Potential Effects of the LIHTC Program on Schools
There are several ways that the LIHTC policy could impact local schools. In the short run, LIHTC properties may foster integration of poor minority children into traditionally segregated white neighborhoods. To the extent that these children come from segregated minority environments there is some evidence to suggest that their educational performance will be below the average in their new school (Vigdor and Ludwig 2007; Jacob and Ludwig 2009 ).
Although there is some evidence to suggest that that movers are no less well adjusted to school than non--movers (Alexander, Entwisle et al. 1996) , mobility is also likely a negative factor (Mao, Whitsett et al. 1997 ). Therefore, the immediate impact may be to lower the school's overall standardized test scores and their rating. On the other hand, families that select into LIHTC properties may have characteristics that make their children relatively high performers in school. After all, the family has managed to move into a subsidized development that is most likely in a better neighborhood than their other opportunities. For example, a survey of a sample of LIHTC residents found that 23% came from public housing and more than 50% rated their current housing better than their previous housing, suggesting that LIHTC units provide a gateway to better private sector housing (Buron, Nolden et al. 2000) .
The literature is unsettled as to whether or not we should expect the negative effects to linger (or even get worse) for several reasons. First, the role of peers in modifying achievement is at best complicated and this is an active area of research. Cooley finds stronger peers effects within reference groups (e.g., the same race) perhaps suggesting that importing some lower performing minority kids into a school will not negatively influence the majority (Cooley 2006 ).
Hoxby also finds that students are influenced by their peers and that the effect may be stronger among peers of the same race (Hoxby 2000) . Burke and Sass find nonlinear effects due to peers. For example, a mean preserving spread in achievement may decrease achievement gains. On the other hand, the lowest achieving students, especially in elementary school, get sizable benefits from middle and high performing peers (Burke and Sass 2008) . Hanushek et al.
also find positive per effects. However, they find that the variance does not matter and that students throughout the achievement distribution seem to benefit from higher performing peers (Hanushek, Kain et al. 2003) . In contrast, Evans, Oates, et al. find that peer effects disappear after controlling for simultaneity (Evans, Oates et al. 1992 ).
There is some evidence that diversity is good. The post--hoc Black--White and Hispanic--White achievement gaps appear to be smaller in racially diverse schools (Bali and Alvarez 2004) and the SAT score differential between blacks and whites is greater in more racially segregated cities. Moreover, the neighborhood characteristics seem to matter the most not the segregation within schools (Card and Rothstein 2007) . A second area for uncertainty on what to expect about the longer--term impacts of LIHTC properties on local schools encompasses the behavioral responses of parents, school administrators and teachers. As noted above, some families may simply move from the LIHTC--impacted area although using real estate data from the Dallas area Ezzet--Lofstrom and
Murdoch did not find depreciated property values as a result of proximity to LIHTC units (Ezzet--Lofstrom and Murdoch 2007). Not withstanding, if some of the best achieving students vacate the local school, the overall rating would suffer. Teachers, now confronted with more minority students, may also seek alternative locations (Scafidia, Sjoquistb et al. 2007 ). Moreover, the pre--existing input combinations may be suboptimal after the opening of the LIHTC units. In particular, with the arrival of poorer performing students, pre--existing class sizes may be too large (Lazear 2001) . Another behavioral impact from teachers concerns assessments. Ouazad finds that teachers give higher assessments to children of their own race. Thus, if the LIHTC children enter a situation where most of their teachers are different in terms of race and ethnicity their performance may not improve (Ouazad 2008 ).
On the other hand, administrators do seem to respond to accountability ratings (Hanushek and Raymond 2005 ). An initial negative impact from LIHTC properties may be met with additional resources and better teachers. Both better teachers and smaller classes could mitigate any negative impacts although better teachers appear to be the more powerful policy option (Rivkin, Hanushek et al. 2005) . Similarly, parents may increase their input into their child's education in order to compensate for any real or perceived negative impacts. Overall, it is not clear what our expectation should be; i.e., this appears to be an empirical question. A non--negative finding may quell some concerns over scattering low--income housing, while a negative effect will confirm lay beliefs about the social consequences of such programs.
Data
The data come primarily from two sources. First, TDHCA provided a current database on LIHTC units in Texas. This file contains 2311 observations on the LIHTC properties and includes fields for the property address, purpose (e.g., general or limited to elderly residents), date placed in service, number of units (overall and low income), financing information, and the type of project (e.g., new constriction or rehab).
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These data were address--geocoded----in some cases by calling the property contact person to get precise location information-in order to get precise latitude and longitude for the properties. After deleting the cases without information on the number and type of units or the placed--in--service year, we ended up with 1970
observations. Summary information about these data is presented in Table 1 . Notice that the total number of units and the number for low income are almost the same indicating that the bulk of these projects provide housing for low--income tenants. In Table 2 The distributions look similar for the other years. Not surprisingly most campuses are acceptable, recognized or exemplary. A bit more curious is the almost even distribution between the last two categories.
The TDHCA data on LIHTC properties and the TEA data were spatially joined using a three--step process. First, each LIHTC property was assigned its school district using a point--in--polygon operation in a GIS. Next, for each year, each LIHTC that existed in that year was assigned to its nearest campus, based on straight--line distance, which was in its district. Finally, we determined the total units of LIHTC properties assigned to each school each year. It is important note that no campus was assigned a LIHTC property that was outside of its school district even if the LIHTC property happened to be within a mile. 2 See http://www.tea.state.tx.us. 3 The TEA web site also contains a GIS file with the district boundaries, and addresses for the campuses within districts. The campus--level data were address--geocoded in order to get the precise latitude and longitude for their locations. 4 Besides deleting cases without ratings, we deleted approximately 300 cases with anomalous data in terms of total number of students, total number of teachers and student teacher ratios. 
Analysis
Our goal is to investigate the direction and statistical significance of the impact of changes in nearby LIHTC units on changes in ratings. With the panel of elementary schools, presumably, we can identify these impacts using a couple of different strategies. One way is estimate regressions with school fixed effects with ordered probit. However, we found with that with ordered limited dependent variable this strategy simply took to long to be a reasonable approach. Thus, we opted for regressing changes in the number of LIHTC units ( ΔUNITS ) on ΔRATING with controls for the changes in other potentially important time--varying school--level characteristics that might impact academic ratings. Differencing the data should remove the time--invariant effects. Since ΔRATING is also an ordinal categorical variable (but with seven categories), we proceed by using ordered probit for the regressions.
In Table 3 , we display the correlation coefficients for the main variables used in the regressions. Note that we use " Δ " for year--over--year change and the subscript "--1" to denote a one lag. The surprising pattern in Table 3 is the apparent lack of any association between the LIHTC variables and the campus--level student demographics. The highest correlation is 0.012 between the lag of the change in LIHTC units and the change in the percentage of students that are economically disadvantaged. Given the purpose of the LIHTC program, expected to see more movement in demographics as a result of the program. The lack of correlation is probably an indication of just how small the housing program is. The student demographic variables are correlated in predictable ways and they suggest that we probably will not be successful at estimating independent effects for each variable. PLOWSES and PLEP go down when PWHITE increases; and, of course, ΔSTRATIO and ΔNSTUDENTS are positively related. Table 4 shows several models of ΔRATING . Model (1) is simply a bivariate specification that indicates that the unconditional association between ΔRATING and ΔUNITS is positive, meaning that a positive annual change in the number of LIHTC units is associated with a positive change in the academic rating of the nearest elementary school. (The t--ratio is 1.45.)
The "Cuts" in Table 4 denote the estimated values of the underlying latent variable of the ordered probit model, which we might think of as "academic improvement". For example, in
Model (1) . The ordered probit model also implies a set of marginal effects; i.e., the increment to the probability of being in one of the categories from an increment in an independent variable. Once again, using the estimates in Model 1, we find that the increments to the probabilities of being in categories 1--7 from a 100 increment in ΔUNITS model are:
--0.000011, --0.0009, --0.0094, --0.0038, 0.0122, 0.002, 0.000021, respectively. In other words, an increase in the number of LIHTC units nearby implies that the probability distribution shifts in such a way that it is now more likely that the nearest school has a positive change in its rating. 5
Model (2) includes the one period lag of ΔUNITS . The idea here is to allow the impacts to take longer than one year. Interestingly, Model (2) implies a larger contemporaneous effect with some lingering negative effects of almost exactly the same magnitude and precision as the coefficient on ΔUNITS . (The second lag-not displayed----is completely insignificant.) Thus, it appears as though any initial positive impacts from LIHTC units are negated after a year.
Models (3) -(6) add sequentially ΔSTRATIO , ΔNSTUDENTS and their lags. If the positive impact of LIHTC units is due to the extra resources associated with serving more children, we would expect these terms to washout the effect. However, we see that for all models the estimates on ΔUNITS are consistent. Not surprisingly, both ΔSTRATIO and its lag are negative.
Similarly, ΔNSTUDENTS is negative and it explains the contemporaneous student ratio effect.
However, the lag of the student teacher ratio remains robust even with the addition of the lag of ΔNSTUDENTS . Evidently, a higher student teacher ratio will negatively effect ratings the following year. Table 5 shows four additional specifications labeled Models (7), (8), (9), and (10). In these models we add changes in student characteristics in an attempt to explain away the LIHTC findings. The new variables are changes in the percentage of the students that are economically disadvantaged, white, and of limited English proficiency. Clearly, the change in PWHITE dominates these effects but it does not have much impact on the first set of variables.
Hence, ΔUNITS , and ΔSTRATIO remain robust. (Of course, we know that ΔSTRATIO will be affected by ΔNSTUDENTS .)
Discussion
These preliminary results are intriguing for a couple of reasons. First, it is surprising that we found any relationship at all between LIHTC units and school ratings. After all, compared to the number of elementary schools, there aren't a lot new LIHTC units each year. In other words, the "treatment" is relatively small. Moreover, even using the ratings has an indicator of academic success is problematic (Kane and Staiger 2002) . It would not have been too surprising if the models were completely insignificant. Second, the findings with respect to student--teacher ratio, school size and percentage of the student body that is white make perfect sense, giving some confidence in the overall structure of the model and help alleviate our overall concerns about using the ratings data. Third, the findings with respect to LIHTC units offer "food for thought" in the sense that they point toward alternative explanations for the potential role played by LIHTC units.
For example, it seems as though the kids from LIHTC units give an initial bump (on average) to nearby schools but that the effect is mitigated after one year. Is it possible that the LIHTC kids are strong performers who, through peer, teacher, and other school--level effects, tend back toward the mean of the school after a year or so? Alternatively, do the LIHTC results simply pick up an external condition such as economic development? The idea would be that economic development, being driven by rational developers, is driven toward positively trending schools; hence, LIHTC units just so happen to appear simultaneously with increases in ratings. However, after the development the school is different in some fashion and the ratings tend to fall. At first glance this alternative explanation seems plausible. However, if it were true, one would think that the changes in school demographics would wash out the lag on the LIHTC terms. Yet, these are robust.
Perhaps this study suggests that it may be worth trying to conduct a student--level study although it will be difficult to find the data. A student--level study would allow for more control over the demographics and potentially allow us to determine differences in school characteristics for kids who move into LIHTC properties. In this study, we are attempting to infer something about the LIHTC kids by looking at changes in their nearest school.
In conclusion, it is probably worth stressing that the overall findings suggest that there is very little impact from LIHTC units on neighborhood schools. This seems true regardless of the explanation of how the effects are working. 
